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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
KENNETH YARDLEY, d/b/a 
YARDLEY DAIRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case is a declaratory judgment attion to deter-
mine whether or not the Defendant, Kenneth Yardley, is af-
forded insurance coverage under a policy of insurance issued 
by the Plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange, for claims made 
against him by James Cole, who was injure4 in an accident 
occurring on January 25, 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER CpURT 
The case came on for trial before a jury on April 22, 
1975, to determine the question of coverage under the policy 
of insurance. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the 
trial court excused the jury and heard atid granted over De-
Case Noi. 14541 
fendant's objection the Motion of Plaintiff that the Court 
rule as a matter of law that the relationship between the 
Defendant and James Cole was that of employer-employee, 
and not that of principal-independent contractor. The 
Court, having ruled as a matter of law as to the employment 
relationship between the Defendant and James Cole, official-
ly discharged the jury and removed from its consideration 
all factual issues in the case. The Plaintiff further moved 
the Court to determine as a matter of law whether or not 
there was coverage under the policy of insurance. The 
latter motion was taken under advisement by the Court. On 
January 3, 1976, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, finding that the injuries of James Cole 
arose out of and in the scope of his employment for the 
insured, and concluding that at the time of the injury, James 
Cole "was an employee of the Defendant acting in the course 
of his employment by the Defendant, and no coverage was af-
forded to the Defendant under the policy of insurance of the 
Plaintiff for the claim made by James Cole against the De-
fendant or for the law suit filed by James Cole against the 
Defendant.11 On February 3, 1976, the Court entered Judgment, 
adjudging and decreeing that the Defendant, Kenneth Yardley, 
is afforded no coverage under his insurance policy with the 
Plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange, for the said injuries 
sustained by James Cole. The Court made no award with re-
spect to costs of the action. 
-2-
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully urges this Court to remand the 
case to the trial court for the purpose of submitting to 
the jury the question of: 
1. Whether the relationship between the Defendant, 
Kenneth Yardley, and James Cole was that of employer-employ-
ee or principal-independent contractor, 
2. Whether the injury sustained by Jarr^ es Cole consti-
tutes a bodily injury arising out of and in the course of 
said James Cole's employment by the insuredr 
This request for remand to the trial C]burt is made on 
the following grounds: 
1. There is not a sufficient factual basis upon which 
the Court, when viewing the evidence in a light most favora-
ble to the Defendant, may determine as a matter of law that 
the employment relationship between the Defendant and James 
Cole was that of employer-employee. The Cfourt, in so find-
ing, invaded the province of the jury. 
2. The trial court further invaded tthe province of 
the jury by removing from the juryfs consideration the 
essential factual issue of whether or not James Cole's in-
juries constituted bodily injury "arising out of and in the 
course of his employment by the insured..,.". 
STATEMENT OF THE FACT$ 
For the last several years, Defendant has been the 
owner and operator of a small dairy operation, known as 
-3-
Yardley Dairy, located in Beaver County, State of Utah. 
The dairy is for the most part a family operation involv-
ing the Defendant, his wife, his father and a son. 
Due to the relatively small size of the dairy opera-
tion, it has not been necessary for the Defendant to hire 
additional persons to help him on a permanent basis. Oc-
casionally, however, it has become necessary, from time to 
time, to hire temporary seasonal help, particularly in the 
fall of the year (Tr. 76)*. 
In the fall of the year 1972, the Defendant hired 
James Cole, whom he knew to be a retired professional truck 
driver, to haul silage by truck from the cornfields in Mil-
ford, Utah, to the Defendant's dairy operation in Greenville, 
both in Beaver County. For hauling the silage, the Defendant 
paid James Cole on a per-hour basis, and the Defendant pro-
vided the truck and supplied the gas, oil and maintenance 
for the truck (Tr. 12, 78, 79). 
James Cole performed several other odd jobs for the 
Defendant and was paid generally on a per-hour basis. How-
ever, sometime during the winter of 1972, Mr. Cole contrac-
ted with the Defendant to haul grain from a grain elevator 
in Venice, Utah (near Richfield) to Defendant's dairy oper-
ation in Greenville. The round trip, including the loading 
of the truck at the grain elevator, required at least three 
and a half hours (Tr. 86). It was agreed that the Defen-
dant would pay Mr. Cole a flat fee of $15 per trip, regard-
*Re£erence is hereby made to particular pages of the trans-
cript of the trial. 
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less of the actual amount of time Mr. Cole wajs gone. (Tr. 
21-23, 85-87, 113). 
The grain was used in Defendant's dairy operation and 
was fed to the dairy cows during the milking process. 
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the defendant no-
tified Mr. Cole whenever the level of the grjain in Defen-
dant's granary reached the point where ther^ was only 
enough grain for approximately one more day4 The need 
for another load of grain was usually communicated to Mr. 
Cole the evening before the trip was to be pade. The fol-
lowing morning, Mr. Cole arrived at the dairy, at which 
time the truck was normally ready for Mr. Cole to take to 
Venice for a load of grain. The only duties that Mr. Cole 
had under the contract were to drive the t^ ruck to Venice, 
load it, place a tarp over the truck and derive the load of 
grain back to Yardley Dairy. Mr. Yardley &nd Mr. Cole 
both testified at the trial that unloading the truck at 
the Yardley Dairy was not a part of Mr. Cole's responsibi-
lities under the grain hauling arrangement (Tr. 22, 112). 
The normal method employed by the Defendant to un-
load the load of grain into the grain bin is well established 
in the facts and undisputed. The grain b|in has a capacity 
slightly less than the truck. The truck is backed up to 
the grain elevator, a tractor with a pow^r takeoff shaft is 
backed up to the side of the elevator, tlfie power takeoff 
shaft is attached to the drive shaft of the elevator and the 
power takeoff mechanism on the tractor is engaged, causing 
the elevator to operate. The power hoisft on the truck is 
-5-
then raised and the flow of the grain from the truck is 
adjusted to the capacity of the grain elevator (Tr. 106). 
Because of the difference between the capacity of the 
grain bin and that of the truck, there is normally some 
grain left over in the truck when the grain bin becomes 
completely full (Tr. 107). 
On a single occasion, prior to the date that Mr. 
Cole sustained certain injuries (described hereafter)^ 
Mr. Cole was asked to assist in the unloading process. 
For his assistance, the Defendant paid him $10 in addi-
tion to the $15 for hauling the grain. 
On the morning of January 25, 1973, Mr. Cole arrived 
at the Yardley Dairy for the purpose of getting the truck 
to obtain another load of grain from Venice. The Defen-
dant had notified him either the night before or that 
same morning, as was customary, that another load was 
needed (Tr. 29). When he arrived, the hoist on the truck 
was still in an elevated position, and there was still a 
small amount of grain left in the back corners of the truck 
bed. When Mr. Cole arrived to pick up the truck, the De-
fendant was in the final process of milking the cows. At 
this point in the testimony at trial, there exists a fac-
tual dispute as to whether or not Mr. Cole was asked or 
authorized by the Defendant to assist in unloading the re-
maining portion of the grain from the truck. Mr. Cole 
testified that he was asked to assist John Cartwright, a 
part-time employee of the Defendant, with the unloading 
(Tr. 29). The Defendant, on the other hand, testified 
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that he told Mr. Cole that he would have to v^ ait approxi-
mately thirty minutes until the finaJ two set^ s of cows 
were milked, and then the Defendant would finish unloading 
the truck (Tr. 109-112). 
At any rate, while the Defendant was finishing the 
milking, Mr. Cole became involved in the unloading pro-
cess and was injured. 
Thereafter, Mr. Cole filed a civil sui^ : against the 
Defendant for damages resulting from his injjury. The 
Defendant referred the claim to the Plaintijff insurance 
company, and this declaratory judgment action was brought 
thereafter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BA$IS UPON WHICH 
THE COURT, WHEN VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN A,'LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT, MAY DETERMINE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEFEN-
DANT AND JAMES COLE WAS THAT OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE. THE 
COURT, IN SO FINDING, INVADED THE PROVINCjE OF THE JURY. 
The question of whether a particular employment re-
lationship is that of employer-employee cj>r principal-
independent contractor is generally considered to be a 
question of fact, particularly where the facts surrounding 
the particular relationship are in conflfict. Beutler v. 
MacGregor Triangle Company, 85 Idaho 41^, 380 P. 2d 1 
(1963). An employment status becomes a question of law 
only if from all of the facts only a single inference and 
one conclusion may be drawn, whether oxi£ be an employee 
-7-
or independent contractor* Yucaipa Farmers Co-op Associa-
tion v, Industrial Accident Commission, 55 C. A. 2d 234, 
130 P. 2d 146 (1942). In other words, a trial court, sitting 
with a jury, may not rule as a matter of law that an employ-
er-employee relationship exists under certain circumstances 
where the inference may be reasonably drawn from the facts 
that a principal-independent contractor relationship exists 
under those same circumstances. It is Defendant's position 
that the facts in the record of this case, when viewed in 
a light most favorable to the Defendant and in accordance 
with the authorities cited hereafter, reasonably support 
the inference that a jury could draw that the relationship 
existing between the Defendant and James Cole was that of 
principal-independent contractor. 
It is apparent, from an examination of the cases in-
volving the independent contractor relationship, that 
there is no absolute rule for determining whether one is an 
independent contractor or an employee, and that each case 
must be determined on its own facts. 41 Am Jur 2d 743. 
There are, however, a number of fairly typical indicia of 
the status of an independent contractor, and it is generally 
recognized that the presence of one or more of such indicia 
in a case is not necessarily conclusive. 41 Am Jur 2d 743. 
According to the Restatement of Agency 2d, the following 
matters of fact, among others, are considered in determining 
whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent 
contractor: 
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(a) The extent of control which, by th^ agree-
ment, the master may exercise over the details 
of the work. 
(b) Whether or not the one employed is engaged 
in a distinct occupation or business. 
(c) The kind of occupation, with reference to 
whether, in the locality, the work is Ujsually 
done under the direction of the employer or by 
a specialist without supervision. 
(d) The skill required in a particular occupa-
tion. 
(e) Whether the employer or the workman supplies 
the instrumentalities, tools and the p^ Lace of 
work for the person doing the work. 
(f) The length of time for which the person is 
employed. 
(g) The method of payment, whether by the time 
or by the job. 
(h) Whether or not the work is a part| of the 
regular business of the employer. 
(i) Whether or not the parties believe that they 
are creating a relation of master and servant. 
(j) Whether the principal is or is nbt in busi-
ness. 
Restatement of Agency 2d, Sec. 220 (2|). 
It should be noted that the so calle4 "independent 
calling11 or "own business11 test, item (b) above, is not 
followed in the State of Utah. Christean v. Industrial 
Commission, 113 Utah 451, 196 P. 2d 502 (JL948). 
In the Christean case, supra, this C^urt adopted the 
rest of the criteria set forth in the Resjtatement of Agency, 
Sec. 220, supra, for making the distinction between the two 
employment relationships. In a later ca$e, while endorsing 
the result in Christean, supra, this Cou^t stated that the 
elements of control by the employer and f:he intent of the 
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parties are the most important factors, but that none of 
the factors separately is controlling; all factors must be 
considered together in order to make the proper determina-
tion. Sutton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 9 Utah 2d 
339, 344 P. 2d 538 (1959). 
Concerning the intent of the parties, it should be 
remembered that when asked what his personal view of his 
role in the employinent relationship was, Cole unequivocally 
responded, "independent contractor" (Tr. 55). The Defen-
dants testimony regarding his view of the relationship 
strongly suggests that he believed and intended the re-
lationship to be that of principal-independent contractor 
(Tr. 112, 113). 
The element of control, as well as the other typical 
status-determining factors, can best be applied to the 
instant factual setting through the analysis of a case 
handed down by the Utah Supreme Court in 1946, cited as 
Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P. 
2d 136 (1946). In Parkinson, a certain Molyneaux contracted 
with Parkinson, the receiver of a manufacturing company, 
to haul sufficient coke to keep the company supplied at all 
times. The company needed coke for its manufacturing busi-
ness just as it required raw materials for its products. 
The contract in Parkinson, as in the Yardley case, was 
a type of requirements contract. Molyneaux contracted with 
Parkinson to haul sufficient coke to keep the company sup-
plied at all times. It was understood that to keep the 
company supplied Molyneaux would have to haul a minimum 
(10^ 
of thirty-five tons of coke per week. He coi^ ld haul such 
additional amounts as he desired, limited only by the 
company's coke storage capacity. As will be recalled 
from the evidence, it was the storage capacity of Yard-
ley's storage bin and the rate at which the tows ate the 
grain that determined the number of trips required to 
obtain grain. 
In Parkinson, the company was primarily interested 
in obtaining the coke on time and having it deposited 
at convenient places. Whether the coke was hauled by 
direct or circuitous route, how long the trips required, 
what other business the hauler may have involved himself 
with during trips or between the trips, etc., was im-
material to the company so long as it always had readily 
available sufficient coke to operate its plant. The record 
in the Yardley case, poses a very similar set of facts. 
Mr. Yardley's main concern and requirement} were that there 
was always grain available to feed his cows while they were 
milked. Due to the capacity of his storage bin, it 
naturally followed that the need for another load of grain 
only arose at such time as the storage bin was empty or 
very nearly empty. It would have been counterproductive, 
certainly, to make trips more frequently and to leave larger 
quantities of the grain in the truck, exposed to the ele-
ments. 
It was immaterial to Mr. Yardley ho^ z long Mr. Cole 
took or what time he left to get a load of grain. The De-
fendant did express some concern, however, that Mr. Cole 
(ID 
return within the day for his own safety and protection 
and so that there would be grain available to feed the 
cows (Tr. 113, 114). 
It was also immaterial to the Defendant that Mr. Cole, 
on some of the trips, pursued his own independent interests, 
including a small egg selling business, which involved the 
frequent purchase of eggs while en route and their resale 
back in Beaver County. He was also free to allow any 
passengers to accompany him, which he did on at least one 
occasion (Tr. 48, 49). At this point, it should be noted 
that the Yardley case differs slightly from the Parkinson 
case in the respect that Molyneaux owned and used his own 
truck in the hauling process and paid his own expenses, 
while Cole, who was a retired truck driver and did not own 
a truck, drove the Defendantfs truck. The Defendant also 
provided the gas, oil and maintenance for the truck. 
However, whether a contractor or employer furnishes or does 
not furnish the appliances for the job is not in itself 
decisive. HA contractor may be independent, where he has 
control of the doing of the work, although the employer... 
furnishes certain appliances and tools for the prosecution 
of the work." 41 Am Jur 2d 760; Peck v. Woomack, 65 Nev. 
184, 192 P. 2d 874 (1948). 
With the exception of the frequency of the required 
trips and the equipment used in making the trips, Mr. Cole 
had control of the means and manner of accomplishing the 
job, as well as of the result. He was never required to 
account for the miles driven, time spent or gas used. 
(12) 
The arrival of a load of grain, when needed, was the only 
item contracted for, and both Mr. Cole and the Defendant 
are in agreement on that. And for that end result, the 
Defendant agreed to pay and Mr. Cole, in fact, received 
$15 per trip (Tr. 51, 112). 
In Parkinson, Molyneaux was paid by the ton for haul-
ing coke. The measure and time of payment, when considered 
with the other typical indicia, are helpful in determining 
the status of an employment relationship. This Court in 
Stover Bedding Company v. Industrial Commission, cited at 
99 Utah 423, 107 P. 2d 1027 (1940), stated the following: 
The following circumstances generally tend to 
indicate an independent contractor relationship: 
(1) Where the person employed undertakes to per-
form the stipulated work as a whole for a specific 
sum; (2) Where the remuneration of the person 
employed is computed with reference to the quanti-
ty of work performed by him. 
In the instant case, counsel for Plaintiff attempted 
to emphasize and reemphasize that the Defendant could have 
discharged Mr. Cole without incurring any contractual lia-
bility. This Court, in Parkinson, at p. 140, expressed the 
opinion from all the facts and circumstances of the Parkin-
son case that the company did not have the control of 
Molyneaux contemplated by the statute to make the relation-
ship that of employer-employee. The Court further stated, 
"the facts that the company could determine the place where 
the work was to be done and had the right to discharge 
Molyneaux at any time without contractual liability are not 
controlling. Anyone employing an independent contractor... 
has the right to determine where he wants the work to be 
(13) 
done*., the mere right to discharge without contractual 
liability is not sufficient control to make an employer-
employee relationship though it is a factor to be con-
sidered with all the other pertinent facts and circum-
stances in determining that relationship.11 Parkinson 
v. Industrial Commission, supra, at p. 140. 
The Court in Parkinson also considered the factor 
of whether or not the work performed by Molyneaux was 
a part or process in the trade or business of the employ-
er within the meaning of the statute. The Court determined, 
that while the obtaining of the coke was a necessary con-
dition for the carrying on of the companyfs business, the 
company was not in the trucking business nor in the busi-
ness of selling coke. Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 
supra, at p. 140. The same argument applies in the instant 
case. While the obtaining of the grain was a necessary 
condition for the carrying on of the Yardley Dairy's busi-
ness, the company was not in the trucking business nor in 
the business of selling grain. The hauling of grain was, 
therefore, not "a part or process in the trade or business11 
of Yardley Dairy. 
Finally, concerning the factor of the skill required 
in a particular occupation, the Defendant testified that he 
was well aware of Mr. Cole's past background and experience 
as a professional truck driver and that the Defendant's 
knowledge thereof was one of the considerations in his 
hiring Mr. Cole to drive the truck (Tr. 98). Mr. Cole tes-
tified that he had been a professional truck driver for 23 
(14) 
or 24 years prior to his retirement from the profession 
in approximately the year 1968 (Tr. 31, 32). He later 
moved to Beaver, Utah, from the Southern California area 
and took what jobs he could find in the area, including 
some truck driving, in order to supplement his income (Tr. 
33). Mr. Yardleyfs knowledge and reliance upon his pro-
fessional competence as a truck driver should, at least, 
be considered as a factor in determining th^ nature of 
the employment relationship. 
The Court in Parkinson found Molyneaux to be an in-
dependent contractor and reversed the award) of the 
Industrial Commission. The Defendant in thje instant 
case respectfully submits that in light of the foregoing 
authorities and analysis, and particularly in view of the 
similarity between the instant case and the Parkinson case, 
there remains an essential question of fact that should 
have been submitted to the jury. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER INVADED THE PROVINCE OF THE 
JURY BY REMOVING FROM THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION THE ESSEN-
TIAL FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT JAMES COLE'S INJURIES 
CONSTITUTED BODILY INJURY "ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY THE INSURED...". 
Once the nature of the employment relationship in the 
instant case is properly determined by the jury, there still 
remains the factual inquiry of whether ot not the facts and 
circumstances of the instant case fit one or more of the 
exclusions in the policy of insurance issued by Plaintiff 
(15) 
to the Defendant, and whether, based on that initial 
determination, whether there is coverage under the policy. 
Even if the trial court had properly ruled as a matter of 
law that an employer-employee relationship existed, the 
Court would still be required to submit the remaining 
factual issues to the jury unless there existed an ade-
quate factual basis upon which the Court could, as a matter 
of law, rule that coverage was excluded under the policy. 
In this case, the Court did not rule as a matter of law 
but rather as a matter of fact that f,the injuries of James 
Cole arose out of and in the scope of his employment for 
the insured as other than a domestic employee." c.f. Trial 
Court's Finding of Fact No. 7. The Court ruled based on 
the seven Findings of Fact made by the Court, not by the 
jury, that there was no coverage under the insurance policy. 
Defendant respectfully submits that it was error for 
the Court to sit as finder of fact in a case where the jury 
had been requested and had been given the sole responsibility. 
Naturally, counsel for the parties, or the parties themselves, 
may narrow the issues to be presented to the jury by stipula-
tion or other agreement. There is some language in the re-
cord by the Court that would tend to suggest that the Court 
was of the impression that the parties or their counsel had 
narrowed the issues (Tr. 121, 122); however, the record itself 
is devoid of any stipulation or agreement on the part of par-
ties or their counsel to remove from the jury's consideration 
any and all factual questions other than the question of the 
nature of the employment relationship. For the reasons stated 
herein, all issues of fact in the instant case should 
have been submitted to the jury for their determination; 
and the trial court erred in pre-empting the prerogative 
of the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, and pursuant to the 
authorities stated, the Appellant respectfully prays 
this Court to remand the case to the trial court for the 
purpose of submitting to the jury: 
1. The question of whether the relationship between 
the Defendant, Kenneth Yardley, and James Cole was that of 
employer-employee or principal-independent contractor, 
2. The question of whether thefajury sustained by 
James Cole constitutes a bodily injury arising out of and 
in the course of said James Colefs employment by the in-
sured. 
3. All other issues of fact remaining in the case. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CLINE, JACKSON, MAYER & BENSON 
BY: " •, . .,, ,_ ~-~ ^ > ^ . 
. I.I " m u n i " •» • » • L, r . . •» • •• ., I 
JOSEPH E. JACKSON 
Z"' Attorneys for Appellant j 
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